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The Long Road Back: Business Roundtable and the 
Future of SEC Rulemaking 
Jill E. Fisch* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) 
has faced a number of challenges in the last few years. Judge Rakoff’s 
decision in Citigroup,1 the Madoff scandal,2 and the Business Roundtable 
decision3 are just a few of the developments that have dealt lasting dam-
age to the SEC’s reputation.4 Critics have scrutinized the agency’s 
decisionmaking on multiple fronts—from its enforcement policy to the 
quality of its rulemaking—and the SEC has largely come up short in the 
analysis.5 The once-revered top cop6 of the securities markets has taken a 
hit, and it is unclear whether it can recover. 
                                                 
* Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
 1. In SEC v. Citigroup, Judge Jed S. Rakoff refused to approve the settlement of an SEC en-
forcement action against Citigroup. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). In the context of his decision, Judge Rakoff raised a variety of questions and con-
cerns about the SEC’s enforcement policies and settlement practices. See Order Directing Hearing, 
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/70540706/Judge-Rakoff-s-order-in-S-E-C-v-Citigroup-Global-Markets 
(inviting the SEC to justify various of its policies). The case is currently on appeal to the Second 
Circuit, which issued a preliminary opinion suggesting that it is likely to overturn the lower court’s 
decision. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (granting a stay of 
the lower court’s order). 
 2. Bernie Madoff’s thirteen-billion dollar Ponzi scheme was reportedly the largest in history. 
See Steven Pearlstein, SEC’s Gaping Blind Spots Kept Madoff’s Misdeeds Out of Sight, WASH. 
POST, July 1, 2009, at A13 (describing the SEC’s failure to uncover a sixteen-year scheme despite 
numerous inquiries and warnings); Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 654–58 (2010) (identifying 
various explanations for the SEC’s failure to investigate the Madoff case more effectively). 
 3. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 4. See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, Madoff Case Haunts SEC as Panel Weighs Budget, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 7, 2012, at A13 (reporting questions raised by a congressional panel about the SEC’s 
budget request in light of its failure to detect Madoff’s Ponzi scheme). 
 5. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop: The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785 
(2009) (describing criticisms of SEC regulatory and enforcement policies in the context of the 2008 
financial crisis). 
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The Business Roundtable decision is of particular importance. The 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(Dodd-Frank)7 tasked the SEC with an unprecedented number of re-
quired rulemakings.8 Although the SEC has failed to complete many of 
these within the statutorily mandated time frames,9 the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),10 signed by President Obama on April 
5, 2012, requires additional SEC rulemaking in connection with its im-
plementation.11 Commentators have observed that these rulemakings 
must withstand the rigorous scrutiny to which the D.C. Circuit subjected 
the SEC’s proxy access rule.12 Indeed, the media reports that regulators 
are “paralyzed” by the threat of litigation.13 The SEC has also announced 
                                                                                                             
 6. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 2009 Southeast-
ern Securities Conference (Mar. 19, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2009/spch031909tap.htm) (describing the SEC as “an agency with a tradition of excellence that 
dates back 75 years”). 
 7. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV 
2010)). 
 8. See, e.g., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presen 
tation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_ 
Summary.pdf (describing the Dodd-Frank Act as containing 243 required rulemakings and sixty-
seven studies, including ninety-five rulemakings and seventeen studies directed specifically at the 
SEC). Notably, the decision also threatens the rulemakings conducted by other agencies, some of 
which face more substantial statutory requirements than the SEC. See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch & Chris-
topher Doering, Analysis: Bruised Regulators Brace for Dodd-Frank Court Fights, REUTERS (Aug. 
4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/04/us-financial-regulation-courts-idUSTRE7730K 
220110804 (describing implications of the decision for CFTC rulemaking). 
 9. See, e.g., Karen Kroll, What’s the Holdup With Dodd-Frank Rulemaking?, COMPLIANCE 
WEEK, May 8, 2012 (reporting that, as of May 1, 2012, two-thirds of Dodd-Frank rulemaking dead-
lines had been missed). 
 10. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 11. See, e.g., James Hamilton, SEC Chair Tells House Panel that SEC Rulemaking Teams 
Working on Complex JOBS Act Implementing Regulations, DODD-FRANK NEWS CENTER (Apr. 25, 
2012, 4:55 PM), http://financialreform.wolterskluwerlb.com/2012/04/sec-chair-tells-house-panel-
that-sec-rulemaking-teams-working-on-complex-jobs-act-implementing-regul.html (recounting that 
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro told the House Financial Services Committee that “the rulemaking 
required for implementation of many new JOBS Act provisions will be complex”); J. Robert Brown 
Jr., The SEC and the Non-Cost Benefit Analysis (Part 4), RACE TO THE BOTTOM (Apr. 26, 2012, 
6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/the-sec-and-the-non-cost-benefit-analysis-
analysis-part-4.html (describing some of the SEC rulemaking required by the JOBS Act). 
 12. See Brown, supra note 11 (noting that “Business Roundtable will require a lengthy and far 
more detailed cost benefit analysis”). 
 13. Christopher Doering, Financial Regulators “Paralyzed” by Threat of Wall Street Lawsuits, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/08/financial-regulators-
paralyzed-threat-wall-street-lawsuits_n_1332294.html?ref=business. 
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a number of changes to its rulemaking practices in response to the Busi-
ness Roundtable decision.14 
Rule 14a-11, the SEC’s proxy access rule, was clearly flawed, a 
point I detail extensively in other work.15 It is unlikely, however, that 
these flaws resulted from the SEC’s failure to conduct an adequate cost-
benefit analysis, the basis on which the D.C. Circuit invalidated the rule. 
Similarly, it is unlikely that the SEC’s changes to its rulemaking proce-
dures, which focus largely on the role of economic analysis, address the 
true weaknesses in those procedures. Instead, this Article argues that the 
SEC’s decisionmaking process is artificially constrained by structural 
requirements that limit the agency’s effectiveness in formulating policy 
and reaching consensus. As a result, the rationales for its rules are inade-
quately articulated, and the rules are poorly designed. 
As a first step, it is necessary to evaluate the Business Roundtable 
decision more carefully. This Article examines the decision and the con-
text in which it was decided in Part II. In Part III, this Article discusses 
the statutory obligations imposed on SEC rulemaking that the court ap-
plied in the Business Roundtable case—the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)16 and section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933.17 Part IV ex-
plores two critical structural constraints on SEC rulemaking—the notice-
and-comment procedure imposed by the APA, as well as the Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act (the Sunshine Act)18—and describes the practi-
cal effect that these constraints have on the rulemaking process in gen-
eral and on Rule 14a-11 in particular. In Part V, this Article considers the 
effect of Dodd-Frank’s legislative policy choices on judicial oversight of 
agency rulemaking. 
Bad rules make bad law, and Rule 14a-11 was arguably a bad 
rule.19 But the flaws in SEC rulemaking are quite different from those 
identified by the D.C. Circuit. At the same time, the Business Roundtable 
decision was itself flawed. In evaluating the SEC’s decision to adopt a 
proxy access rule, the D.C. Circuit completely disregarded the congres-
                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning 
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking (Apr. 17, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2012/ts041712mls.htm) (describing new staff guidance for 
conducting economic analysis in connection with proposed rulemaking). 
 15. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 435 (2012). 
 16. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 
5). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). Congress added the same language to § 3(f) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934. See id. § 78c(f). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976). 
 19. See generally Fisch, supra note 15 (describing flaws in Rule 14a-11). 
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sional policy judgments reflected in Dodd-Frank. Congress played a crit-
ical role by explicitly authorizing the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule. 
By substituting its own policy judgment for that of Congress, the D.C. 
Circuit threatens not just the ability of administrative agencies to formu-
late regulatory policy, but also the ability of Congress to direct agency 
policymaking. Explicit congressional determinations regarding regulato-
ry policy warrant greater judicial deference than the courts have given to 
them. At the same time, Congress may implicitly subject the agency’s 
implementation of that policy to greater scrutiny as to whether the agen-
cy has been faithful to its legislative directive. 
II. THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE DECISION 
A. Background to the Decision: The Proxy Access Rule 
The starting point of this Article is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
Business Roundtable.20 This case presented a challenge to the legitimacy 
of Rule 14a-11, the proxy access rule that the SEC adopted in 2010.21 
Notably, Congress explicitly authorized the SEC to adopt a proxy access 
rule in section 971 of Dodd-Frank.22 Although the SEC had been consid-
ering some form of proxy access for seventy years23 and had issued a 
notice of proposed rulemaking prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank,24 it 
did not act until after Congress formally authorized a proxy access rule.25 
I have described the provisions of Rule 14a-11 in detail else-
where.26 To summarize, the rule would have required public companies 
                                                 
 20. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 21. Rule 14a-11 was reserved from the 2010 Code of Federal Regulations pending litigation 
over its validity in the D.C. Circuit. After the rule was invalidated in Business Roundtable, the 2011 
Code of Federal Regulations omitted the rule entirely. The rule as adopted can be found at Facilitat-
ing Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677–93 (proposed Sept. 16, 2010). 
 22. Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 23. See Fisch, supra note 15 (observing that the SEC first considered some form of the proxy 
access rule in 1942). 
 24. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 
2009). 
 25. Among the obstacles to the SEC’s prior adoption of a proxy access rule were concerns 
about whether the agency possessed the necessary statutory authority. See, e.g., Letter from David 
Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Chair-
man, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-181.pdf (stating that the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule was “beyond the Commis-
sion’s authority”); Jill E. Fisch, Professor, Statement During SEC Roundtable Discussion on Pro-
posed Security Holder Director Nomination Rules (Mar. 12, 2004) (prepared statement available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/fisch031204.pdf) (citing legislative history of federal 
securities laws in response to concerns about the agency’s statutory authority). 
 26. See generally Fisch, supra note 15 (describing and criticizing the SEC’s proxy access rule). 
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to include a limited number of director candidates nominated by large 
shareholders on the issuer’s proxy statement. To qualify to nominate di-
rector candidates, a shareholder was required to have held at least three 
percent of the company’s stock for three years or more.27 Shareholders 
were not permitted to use Rule 14a-11 to seek control of an issuer.28 Nei-
ther issuers nor states were permitted to create a mechanism by which an 
individual company could opt out of the required proxy access proce-
dure.29 
The Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
which had previously threatened to challenge an SEC rule mandating 
proxy access30 and had successfully challenged other SEC rulemaking 
efforts,31 filed their complaint just a month after the rule was adopted.32 
The petitioners argued, among other claims, that the SEC’s adoption of 
Rule 14a-11 was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA and 
that the SEC failed to adequately assess the rule’s effect on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.33 
B. The Circuit Court Decision 
The D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11, agreeing with the petitioners 
that the SEC had acted arbitrarily and capriciously.34 In particular, the 
court observed that the SEC has “a unique obligation to consider the ef-
fect of a new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital for-
mation.’”35 In concluding that the SEC had failed to meet this obligation, 
the court largely faulted the quality of the SEC’s economic analysis.36 
The court identified several ways in which the SEC had, in the court’s 
                                                 
 27. Id. at 463. 
 28. Id. at 475–76. 
 29. Id. at 490. 
 30. See, e.g., John F. Hartigan et al., Proposed Corporate Governance Changes Applicable to 
Public Companies, MORGAN LEWIS (June 14, 2010), http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publ 
icationID/0e1078ef-16be-40dc-8c84-bfba6c2e528c/fuseaction/publication.detail (describing the 
proxy access proposal as “perhaps the most controversial and potentially divisive aspect of the cor-
porate governance reforms” and observing that the Chamber of Commerce had threatened litigation 
if the SEC adopted the proposal). 
 31. See infra Part II.C (describing other successful challenges to SEC rulemaking). 
 32. See Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
1305). 
 33. Id. at 2. The complaint also alleged that proxy access rules exceeded the SEC’s authority 
and violated the petitioners’ First and Fifth Amendment rights under the Constitution. Id. The D.C. 
Circuit did not reach these issues. 
 34. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (explaining that the agency acted arbitrarily by failing “adequately to assess the eco-
nomic effects of a new rule”). 
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opinion, failed to estimate or quantify the potential costs of proxy access 
properly or failed to obtain sufficient empirical data to support its con-
clusions.37 On issues for which commentators had presented the SEC 
with competing economic analysis, the court criticized the agency’s fail-
ure to “make tough choices about which of the competing estimates is 
most plausible.”38 
The Business Roundtable decision was noteworthy for several rea-
sons. First and foremost was the level of vitriol in the opinion. The court 
did not simply fault the SEC’s rulemaking procedures; it characterized 
the SEC as acting “inconsistently and opportunistically”39 and its reasons 
for acting as “unutterably mindless.”40 The court stated that the SEC’s 
rejection of the petitioners’ prediction of the potential costs of issuer op-
position to shareholder nominees “had no basis beyond mere specula-
tion.”41 The court described the SEC as “ducking serious evaluation of 
the costs that could be imposed [by special interests].”42 Notwithstanding 
the fact that SEC rulemakings are conducted by scores of staff members 
and ultimately adopted by a commission whose composition changes 
over time, the opinion seemed to attribute a stable (and deficient) institu-
tional character to both the SEC and its rulemakings, describing the 
agency as having “failed once again” to conduct an adequate cost-benefit 
analysis.43 
These statements suggest that the court was not merely challenging 
the SEC’s rulemaking process, but was questioning its good faith in ana-
lyzing the desirability of the rule. Although the court did not identify a 
basis for this concern, its language seemed to highlight the particular 
vulnerability of the agency’s reputation and institutional competence. 
The court did not defer to the SEC’s rationale for its rulemaking, its 
evaluation of the quality of alternatives and data presented by industry 
                                                 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 1150 (stating that the SEC “did nothing to estimate and quantify the costs it 
expected companies to incur”). 
 38. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Commentators have argued that the 
court’s empirical analysis was, itself, “cursory.” See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, 
The Bizarre Law & Economics of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 25, 30 (2012). 
 39. Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
 40. Id. at 1156. 
 41. Id. at 1150. 
 42. Id. at 1152. 
 43. Id. at 1148. Notably, one of the cases cited by the court in characterizing the SEC as a 
repeat offender—specifically, the Chamber of Commerce case—was decided in 2004 by a Commis-
sion of which none of the five commissioners who considered Rule 14a-11 was a member. See SEC 
Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2012) (describing periods of service of SEC 
commissioners and showing that none of the commissioners who considered Rule 14a-11 joined the 
Commission until 2006 or after). 
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participants, or its assessment of the methodology of studies included in 
the public-comment file.44 At the same time that the court criticized the 
SEC for inappropriately discounting commentators’ predictions about the 
costs of the rule, the court branded the agency as inconsistent for increas-
ing the qualification requirements to use Rule 14a-11 from its original 
rule proposal—a change that would lower costs by reducing the number 
of shareholder nominations.45 In short, the court’s statements were less 
about the SEC’s failure to assess costs and benefits than the SEC’s erro-
neous assessment. 
Ultimately, the court appeared to make an independent policy 
judgment that, notwithstanding the SEC’s view, proxy access is a bad 
idea. At the same time, language in the opinion suggested the possibility 
that an SEC determination that differed from that of the court (or even 
from that of the petitioners) was, as a result, arbitrary.46 This approach 
reflects a marked contrast to the Second Circuit’s recent statement in the 
Citigroup case, which reflects the more traditional deference to agency 
policymaking.47 As the Citigroup court observed, “[i]t is not . . . the 
proper function of federal courts to dictate policy to executive adminis-
trative agencies.”48 The D.C. Circuit’s substitution of its policy judgment 
for that of the SEC both differs from this traditional deference and poses 
a threat to future agency rulemaking efforts. 
C. The Business Roundtable Opinion in Context 
The D.C. Circuit’s criticism of Rule 14a-11 must be understood in 
context. Business Roundtable was not the first D.C. Circuit decision in 
recent history to invalidate an SEC rule. Indeed, in the Business 
Roundtable opinion, the court highlighted two other recent occasions on 
which it had invalidated SEC rulemaking: American Equity49 and Cham-
ber of Commerce.50 In 2010, the D.C. Circuit in American Equity struck 
down an SEC rule providing that fixed, indexed annuities did not consti-
tute annuity contracts within the meaning of the Securities Act and were, 
                                                 
 44. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (criticizing the SEC for relying on “two rela-
tively unpersuasive studies”). So long as the studies persuaded the SEC, the statutory origin of a 
requirement that they also persuade the reviewing court is illusive. 
 45. Id. at 1152–53. 
 46. See, e.g., id. at 1150–51 (implying that SEC acted arbitrarily in concluding that Rule 14a-
11 would improve board performance and in rejecting an empirical study purporting to reach the 
opposite conclusion). 
 47. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 48. Id. at 163. 
 49. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 50. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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therefore, subject to federal securities regulation rather than merely state 
insurance law.51 
Significantly, despite holding that the SEC’s Rule 151A was enti-
tled to Chevron deference,52 the court invalidated the rule, concluding 
that the agency’s section 2(b) analysis was “flawed.”53 Notably, the SEC 
had made specific findings, as required by section 2(b) of the Securities 
Act, with respect to the rule’s effect on “efficiency, competition and cap-
ital formation.”54 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the SEC’s 
conclusions. Specifically, the court faulted the SEC for insufficiently 
analyzing these factors under the preexisting state-law regulatory re-
gime.55 The court concluded that the SEC’s failure to analyze these fac-
tors under “the existing state law regime renders arbitrary and capricious 
the SEC’s judgment that applying federal securities law” would consti-
tute an improvement.56 
Business Roundtable also relied heavily on the court’s prior deci-
sion in Chamber of Commerce.57 In Chamber of Commerce, the court 
reviewed the SEC’s adoption of mutual fund reforms requiring the 
boards to have an increased percentage of independent directors and an 
independent board chairman.58 The court found that the rule changes 
were within the SEC’s statutory authority to adopt and consistent with 
congressional intent. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the rule 
changes were invalid because the SEC had failed to sufficiently quantify 
the costs associated with their adoption;59 this failure, it held, was incon-
sistent with the agency’s obligations under the analogue to section 2(b) 
in the Investment Company Act.60 
In contrast to the court in Business Roundtable, the Chamber of 
Commerce court stated that the SEC was not required to conduct an em-
pirical study to determine the benefits of its new rules, noting that “de-
pending upon the nature of the problem, an agency may be ‘entitled to 
conduct . . . a general analysis based on informed conjecture.’”61 None-
                                                 
 51. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 167–68. 
 52. Id. at 175–76. Notably, the Business Roundtable decision does not discuss Chevron defer-
ence. 
 53. Id. at 177. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b). 
 55. Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co., 613 F.3d at 177–78. 
 56. Id. at 179. 
 57. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 58. See Investment Company Governance, 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2004). 
 59. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 144. 
 60. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(c). 
 61. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 142 (quoting Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1158 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (omission in original)). 
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theless, the court found that the SEC had failed to consider adequately 
the cost of its new requirements as well as a disclosure alternative to the 
requirement of an independent board chair.62 
Other recent D.C. Circuit decisions evaluating the validity of SEC 
rules follow a similar pattern. In Goldstein v. SEC,63 the court invalidated 
a rule requiring hedge fund registration (a requirement that Congress 
subsequently imposed by statute in Dodd-Frank).64 The SEC adopted the 
rule in response to the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry, which, 
according to the SEC, posed several problems including the growing ac-
cess of retail investors to hedge fund investments and the potential for 
fraud.65 The court rejected the SEC’s rule as an arbitrary departure from 
its prior regulatory policy. The court specifically discounted the agency’s 
findings concerning developments in the industry and the growing eco-
nomic significance of hedge funds to the capital markets.66 
In NetCoalition v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit invalidated an SEC order 
approving a requested fee change by NYSE Arca, a self-regulatory or-
ganization registered with the SEC as a national securities exchange.67 
Specifically, Arca proposed to begin charging a fee for its proprietary 
“depth of book data.”68 Although the court conceded that the SEC acted 
within the scope of its authority and that its choice of approach in evalu-
ating the proposed rule change was reasonable, the court nonetheless 
found that the agency had failed to disclose a “reasoned basis” for con-
cluding that the proposed pricing was reasonable.69 
Finally, in Financial Planning Ass’n v. SEC, the court invalidated 
an SEC rule that broadened the exemption for broker-dealers from regu-
lation under the Investment Advisers Act (IAA) in order to permit bro-
ker-dealers to create alternative fee structures for customer accounts 
without being subject to regulation under the IAA.70 Financial Planning 
Ass’n differs somewhat from the prior cases because the SEC was acting 
under a statute that explicitly authorized it to exempt persons from the 
                                                 
 62. Id. at 143. 
 63. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 64. See Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–71 (2010). 
 65. Goldstein, 412 F.3d at 882. 
 66. See id. (noting that the dissenting commissioners “doubted it”). In addition, the court held 
that the SEC’s interpretation of the term “client” was unreasonable because it created inconsistencies 
in the scope of regulation provided by the IAA. Id. 
 67. NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Under the Securities Act, national 
securities exchanges are required to file proposed rule and fee changes with the SEC for approval. 
The SEC subjects these proposals to its standard notice-and-comment procedure. See id. at 528. 
 68. Id. at 531. 
 69. Id. at 544. 
 70. 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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IAA.71 The court held that this language did not apply because broker-
dealers who did not receive special compensation were already named in 
one of the congressionally enumerated exemptions.72 
This history of repeated invalidations of SEC rulemakings by the 
D.C. Circuit suggests some degree of distrust of the SEC’s policymaking 
judgments. The extent to which this distrust may stem from the agency’s 
involvement in various embarrassments and scandals is unclear. Since 
the 2008 financial crisis, the SEC has been the target of a series of at-
tacks on its competence, credibility, and policymaking, and the number 
of agency missteps and problems has been shockingly high. I have writ-
ten elsewhere, for example, of the extensive criticism directed at the SEC 
over its administration of the Consolidated Supervised Entities program, 
its failure to detect the massive fraud perpetrated by Bernie Madoff, al-
leged improprieties in the agency’s investigation of possible insider trad-
ing at Pequot Capital Management, and several other issues.73 In 2010, a 
former SEC lawyer was convicted of criminal conspiracy for his partici-
pation in a fraudulent “pump and dump” stock scheme.74 In 2011, a high-
profile study reported the extent of the revolving door that exists between 
SEC employment and the subsequent representation of private clients in 
dealings with the agency.75 Even as the D.C. Circuit was announcing its 
Business Roundtable decision, the media was reporting on the SEC’s 
widespread destruction of documents relating to its investigations.76 At 
the same time, the SEC entered into a lease for 900,000 square feet of 
office space that it did not need and lacked the budget to pay for, a deci-
                                                 
 71. The Investment Advisers Act provides that an investment adviser did not include “such 
other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and 
regulations or order.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(H). 
 72. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (exempting “any broker or dealer whose performance of 
such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who re-
ceives no special compensation therefor”). 
 73. See generally Fisch, supra note 5. 
 74. Kara Scannell, Jury Convicts Former SEC Lawyer, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704194504575031941422210152.html. 
 75. David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Staff’s ‘Revolving Door’ Prompts Concerns About Agency’s 
Independence, WASH. POST (May 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/ 
sec-staffs-revolving-door-prompts-concerns-about-agencys-independence/2011/05/12/AF9F0f1G_st 
ory.html. More recently, a former SEC lawyer settled criminal charges that he violated SEC ethics 
rules and continued to represent a client after being told by the SEC that he had a conflict of interest. 
See Andrew Harris, Ex-SEC Enforcer Settles Stanford Ethics Dispute with U.S., BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.business week.com/news/2012-01-18/ex-sec-enforcer-
settles-stanford-ethics-dispute-with-u-s-.html. 
 76. Matt Taibbi, Is the SEC Covering Up Wall Street Crimes?, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/is-the-sec-covering-up-wall-street-crimes-201108 
17. 
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sion that the Inspector General termed “a deeply flawed and unsound 
analysis.”77 
These problems likely carried particular weight at the D.C. Circuit, 
which, because of its location and specialized caseload, is particularly 
sensitive to the functioning of the regulatory agencies.78 It would not be 
unreasonable to conclude that the rulemaking and policy judgments of an 
agency that cannot even exercise its leasing authority appropriately 
should be subjected to careful scrutiny. The D.C. Circuit’s reluctance to 
uphold SEC rules against challenge, however, predates the series of re-
cent scandals. Two of the best known decisions invalidating SEC rule-
making were the D.C. Circuit’s prior Business Roundtable decision in 
1990 overturning the SEC’s one-share, one-vote rule79 and its decision in 
American Bankers Ass’n80 requiring banks that engaged in securities 
business to register as broker-dealers.81 Although the court may have 
become more demanding in its recent scrutiny, its skepticism of SEC 
rulemaking is not a new development. 
Of course, the SEC is not the only agency to have suffered the in-
validation of its rules at the hand of the D.C. Circuit.82 Nor is it the only 
agency to have its rules subjected to the intense “hard look” scrutiny that 
appears to shift from procedural oversight to substantive review.83 On the 
other hand, the string of securities cases is notable because in no case did 
                                                 
 77. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON INVESTIGATION: 
IMPROPER ACTIONS RELATING TO THE LEASING OF OFFICE SPACE 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/oig-553.pdf. 
 78. Commentators have suggested that this familiarity may lead to greater court skepticism of 
agency rulemaking decisions. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 795 (2008) (reporting that D.C. Circuit judges are 
“much less willing to validate the decisions of the EPA and the NLRB in arbitrariness cases than are 
judges in other circuits”). 
 79. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 80. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 81. The rule, which the SEC adopted after an administrative reinterpretation of the Glass-
Steagall Act, responded to the new entry of banks into the brokerage market. This entry was facili-
tated by the subsequent repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999. To the extent that, as some commentators 
argue, the repeal of Glass-Steagall was a contributing factor in the financial crisis because of its role 
in increasing the size and interdependence of the big banks, the SEC’s attempt to regulate bank 
brokerage activities through Rule 3b-9 now appears perspicacious. See, e.g., Peter L. Bernstein, 
What’s Free About Free Enterprise?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28view.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1 (describing the 
repeal of Glass-Steagall as “a key contributor to the calamities now gripping the banking system”). 
 82. See, e.g., EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, No. 11-1302, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 
17535 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2012) (invalidating EPA’s transport rule). 
 83. See discussion infra Part III.A (describing hard look review). 
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the D.C. Circuit uphold a challenged SEC rule.84 The result of the SEC’s 
repeated inability to defend its rules against attack is an absence of deci-
sions that validate a specific rulemaking process or that articulate the 
type of analysis that meets the judicial standard for cost-benefit analy-
sis—the type of decisions that could serve as a roadmap for future agen-
cy action. 
The absence of decisions of this type stands in contrast to the 
court’s oversight of other agencies.85 For example, Professors Thomas 
Miles and Cass Sunstein empirically studied published appellate deci-
sions from 1996 to 2006 reviewing actions by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).86 The 
authors found that the courts validated agency decisions at an overall rate 
of sixty-four percent.87 Similarly, William Jordan’s study of D.C. Circuit 
remands of agency rules between 1985 and 1995 found that, although the 
invalidations often resulted in temporary setbacks, the agencies involved 
successfully implemented their policies in approximately eighty percent 
of the cases in which the D.C. Circuit had originally remanded rules as 
arbitrary and capricious.88 Although empirical data is limited on the 
manner in which courts apply hard look analysis, to the extent that the 
D.C. Circuit’s approach to SEC rulemaking is exceptional, it may in part 
reflect an inherent judicial skepticism about the extent to which financial 
regulation truly involves complex scientific or technical analysis that is 
within the particular competence of the agency such that deference to the 
agency’s judgment is warranted.89 
                                                 
 84. The Supreme Court upheld the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 14e-3, an insider trading pro-
vision, in an appeal of the criminal prosecution of James O’Hagan. See United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. 642 (1997). The opinion did not subject the rule to the type of analysis applied by the D.C. 
Circuit in the cases discussed in the text. See id. But see id. at 680 (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part); United States v. O’Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1997), 
reversed, 521 U.S. 642. The Northern District of California upheld Rule 13b2-2 against a challenge 
in the criminal case of United States v. Reyes, but the opinion did not contain an analysis of the 
rulemaking process. United States v. Reyes, No. C 06-00556 CRB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41632 
(N.D. Cal. May 30, 2007); see also Levy v. Sterling Holding Co. 544 F.3d 493 (3d Cir. 2008) (up-
holding SEC’s amendments to rules under § 16 and the retroactive application of those rules to the 
case at bar). 
 85. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting a challenge to EPA rules regulating the emission of greenhouse gases). 
 86. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 78. 
 87. Id. at 767; see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy?: An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006). 
 88. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Sig-
nificantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemak-
ing?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 440 (2000). 
 89. Cf. Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d at 117 (stating that the EPA had made “a 
‘scientific judgment’ about the potential risks greenhouse gas emissions pose to public health or 
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D. The Response to Business Roundtable 
Commentators interpreted Business Roundtable as a strong state-
ment that the SEC needed to improve its cost-benefit analysis. As one 
law firm commentator observed, “[w]e were struck by just how meticu-
lous the DC Circuit panel expected the SEC to be in assessing the ‘eco-
nomic effects’ of its rules.”90 To examine further the quality of the SEC’s 
economic analysis, the SEC Inspector General conducted two separate 
studies reviewing the SEC’s rulemaking process with respect to particu-
lar Dodd-Frank rulemakings.91 Similarly, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) conducted a study, required by Congress under Dodd-
Frank, of the SEC’s rulemaking process.92 In response to the concerns 
noted in the Business Roundtable decision and these studies, the SEC 
adopted new staff guidance on economic analysis in its rulemaking.93 In 
testimony before Congress, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro described the 
new steps that the SEC staff was taking to improve the economic analy-
sis in its rulemaking process.94 
                                                                                                             
welfare—not policy discussions”); id. at 120 (“[W]e give an extreme degree of deference to the 
agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its technical expertise.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Huls Am. Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the court owes 
an “extreme degree of deference to the agency when it is evaluating scientific data within its tech-
nical expertise”); FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 813–14 (1978) (holding 
that the FCC, in making “judgmental or predictive” factual determinations, did not need “complete 
factual support” because “a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies necessarily 
involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency”). 
 90. Melinda Brunger et al., DC Circuit Panel Vacates Proxy Access Rule, ANDREWS KURTH 
(July 28, 2011), http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-815.html. 
 91. The report on the first study, which examined six specified rulemakings, was released on 
June 13, 2011. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF REVIEW OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES PERFORMED BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN 
CONNECTION WITH DODD-FRANK RULEMAKINGS (2011), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Re 
ports/AuditsInspections/2011/Report_6_13_11.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT I]. Although the report 
identified a few possible areas of improvement, it concluded that the rulemaking procedures had 
complied with the spirit of the cost-benefit analysis set out in the executive orders and that the agen-
cy had identified and reviewed possible alternatives to the proposed rules. Id. at 41. The second 
study was released in January 2012. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK ACT 
RULEMAKINGS (2012), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2012/ 
Rpt%20499_FollowUpReviewofD-F_CostBenefitAnalyses_508.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT II]. 
 92. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK ACT REGULATIONS: 
IMPLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION (2011), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d12151.pdf. 
 93. Memorandum from the Div. of Risk, Strategy & Fin. Innovation and the Office of Gen. 
Counsel to the Staff of the Rulewriting Divs. & Offices (Mar. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf. 
 94. See Schapiro, supra note 14. The steps included greater involvement of economists in the 
rulemaking process; more specific explanations of the justifications for the rule; greater differentia-
tion between the economic impacts resulting from the congressional mandate and those resulting 
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These steps may not be sufficient to satisfy all policymakers. In 
June 2011, Representative Scott Garrett introduced H.R. 2308, the SEC 
Regulatory Accountability Act.95 Among other things, H.R. 2308 pro-
poses to establish explicit requirements for cost-benefit analyses for 
Commission rules and orders.96 The bill would also require the SEC to 
review its regulations at least once every five years to determine whether 
any are “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively burden-
some.”97 In addition, the bill would require the SEC to state, for all major 
rules, the purposes and intended consequences of the rules, and to identi-
fy metrics to measure, after adoption, whether the rule has accomplished 
the stated purposes. 
Although the foregoing criticisms suggest that the SEC’s use of 
cost-benefit analysis is distinctively deficient, studies suggest that the 
expectations of the Business Roundtable court and some commentators 
are outside the norm employed by agencies generally and, more prob-
lematically, are unrealistic. A 2011 report to the Senate from the Com-
mittee on Capital Markets Regulation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
examines several federal agencies’ rulemakings under Dodd-Frank.98 For 
example, the Committee observed that, of 192 proposed and adopted 
Dodd-Frank rules, over a quarter had no cost-benefit analysis at all; over 
a third had entirely nonquantitative cost-benefit analysis; and of the fifty 
rules containing quantitative analysis, the majority were limited to ad-
ministrative and similar costs and therefore failed to account for the 
rules’ expected broader economic impact.99 
Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget’s 2011 Report to 
Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations stated that, of 
the sixty-six major rules promulgated by executive agencies in 2010, the 
                                                                                                             
from the exercise of agency discretion; more extensive discussion and quantification of costs and 
benefits; “more integrated analysis of economic issues (including efficiency, competition, and capi-
tal formation)”; explicit encouragement for commenters to provide quantitative information, and 
discussion of the information provided; and greater discussion of alternatives that the SEC had re-
jected. Id. 
 95. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2011). A similar bill 
was introduced to the Senate in April 2012. SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, S. 2373, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 96. H.R. 2308 § 2(e)(1)(b) (“Before promulgating a regulation under the securities laws . . . the 
Commission shall . . . propose or adopt a regulation or order only on a reasoned determination that 
the benefits of the intended regulation or order justify the costs of the intended regulation or order.”). 
 97. Id. § 2(e)(4). 
 98. Letter from Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation to Congress (Mar. 7, 2012), available at 
http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.03.07_CBA_letter.pdf. 
 99. Media Advisory, Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, CCMR Warns That Inadequate 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Opens Dodd-Frank Rulemaking to Challenge and Delay (Mar. 7, 2012), 
available at http://capmktsreg.org/pdfs/2012.03.07_CBA_letter.pdf. 
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issuing agencies quantified and monetized both costs and benefits for 
only eighteen.100 Of the seventeen major rules promulgated by independ-
ent agencies in 2010, the issuing agencies subjected none to an analysis 
of both anticipated costs and benefits.101 
The utility and practicality of cost-benefit analysis has, of course, 
been widely debated, and an extensive discussion of this debate is be-
yond the scope of this Article.102 It is clear, however, that the increased 
emphasis on cost-benefit analysis has slowed the SEC’s progress on 
adopting the new regulations required by Dodd-Frank and the JOBS 
Act.103 Since Business Roundtable, the pace of SEC rulemaking has 
slowed by about half, largely due to the agency’s effort to analyze costs 
and benefits more comprehensively.104 The concern is that, absent ade-
quate cost-benefit analysis, the agency’s rules face a continued risk of 
invalidation by the D.C. Circuit. The next Part considers, in more detail, 
the legal bases for such invalidation. 
III. STATUTORY LIMITS ON SEC RULEMAKING 
The Business Roundtable decision is based on the federal courts’ 
obligation to ensure that agency rulemaking is consistent with the con-
straints imposed by Congress. SEC rulemaking must conform to the re-
quirements of the APA and the more specific requirements of section 
2(b) of the Securities Act. These constraints, as well as the impact from 
judicial interpretations of such constraints, are addressed in this Part. 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA sets out the ground rules for judicial review of agency 
rulemaking.105 The APA instructs a reviewing court to invalidate agency 
action that is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, 
                                                 
 100. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, 
LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/inforeg/2011_cb/2011_cba_report.pdf. 
 101. Id. at 4. 
 102. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health & Envi-
ronmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191, 193–201 (1980) (identifying difficulties in 
applying cost-benefit analysis to environmental regulation). 
 103. See Edward Wyatt, At House Hearing, Schapiro Says Cost Analyses Are Slowing S.E.C.’s 
Work, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 25, 2012, 3:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/ 
04/25/at-house-hearing-schapiro-says-cost-analyses-are-slowing-s-e-c-s-work/. 
 104. Steven Sloan, Schapiro Says SEC Will Change Cost Calculation of Regulation, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2012, 7:58 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-17/schapiro-
says-sec-will-change-cost-calculation-of-regulation-1-.html. 
 105. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006). 
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or short of statutory right.”106 In addition, the reviewing court is required 
to strike down actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”107 
In applying the APA, courts determine whether an agency has acted 
within the scope of its statutory authority using a deferential standard of 
review commonly known as “Chevron deference.”108 Although Chevron 
is often described as having “revolutionized the jurisprudence of agency 
deference,”109 courts apply Chevron deference surprisingly infrequent-
ly.110 Modern courts closely review the factual record and reasons justi-
fying the agency’s policy choices.111 Commentators have termed this 
closer scrutiny “hard look” review.112 The U.S. Supreme Court set out 
the dominant formulation of the rationality requirement in the State Farm 
case: 
An agency rule [is] arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied 
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a dif-
ference in view or the product of agency expertise.113 
As the Court explained, “the agency must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”114 
                                                 
 106. Id. § 706(2)(C). 
 107. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
 108. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The 
Chevron Court explained, “We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to 
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.” Id. at 
844. 
 109. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1093 
(2008). 
 110. See id. at 1090 (“[F]rom the time it was handed down until the end of the 2005 term, 
Chevron was applied in only 8.3% of Supreme Court cases evaluating agency statutory interpreta-
tions.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Envi-
ronmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1451 (2005) (“[I]n the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘hard look’ 
doctrine evolved, requiring agencies to provide rational explanations for their decisions, justify 
departures from past practices, allow participation by a wide range of interested constituencies, and 
consider reasonable alternatives.”). 
 112. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
525 (1985) (describing the emergence, in the 1970s, of “a new, more rigorous scope of review under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard—a scope of review known as the ‘hard look’”). 
 113. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 114. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
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In squaring hard look review with the principles underlying Chev-
ron deference,115 the Supreme Court justified State Farm’s process-based 
emphasis in terms of permitting judicial oversight under the APA. Courts 
may have greater competence in overseeing the process by which an 
agency formulates its decision than in evaluating the policies underlying 
that decision.116 The D.C. Circuit has stated that reviewing the proce-
dures by which agencies adopt legislative rules falls within the court’s 
“area of competence” and “contribute[s] to the rationality and fairness of 
agency decision making without detracting unduly from its effective-
ness.”117 Hard look review has also been defended as preserving the law-
fulness of agency action, ensuring that the agency develop a factual rec-
ord upon which to deploy its technical expertise, ensuring public partici-
patory values in policy formulation, and protecting the agency’s determi-
nation from politically charged interest-group domination.118 
Nonetheless, hard look review has generated substantial controver-
sy. Much of the controversy stems from the fact that, as in the Business 
Roundtable decision, hard look review appears to have morphed from 
process-based review into substantive review,119 with the court overturn-
ing agency decisions on the basis of its own policy preferences.120 
Courts, of course, deny that they are making independent policy judg-
ments,121 but as in Business Roundtable, this denial is often implausible. 
                                                 
 115. For a more extensive discussion of Chevron deference and its scope, see Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). 
 116. See generally Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the Development 
of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002) (identifying three distinc-
tive justifications for the hard look doctrine among three D.C. Circuit court judges). 
 117. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see Envtl. 
Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“When administrators provide a 
framework for principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the importance of judicial 
review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process . . . .”). 
 118. See, e.g., Sinden, supra note 111 (defending cost-benefit analysis as a tool for combating 
political influence over agency rulemaking). 
119. But see FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (overturning a lower court’s 
decision to apply an overly high standard in reviewing rationality of agency rulemaking). 
 120. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 78, at 806–07 (“The best conclusion is that in its 
operation, arbitrariness review is significantly affected by the ideological dispositions of federal 
judges in a way that produces serious errors in light of the aspirations of State Farm itself.”). Courts 
may be skeptical of agency policy judgments for many reasons ranging from the politicization of 
agency rulemaking to concerns over agency capture. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory 
and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1039–44, 1059–67 (1997) (“[M]any feder-
al judges became convinced that agencies were prone to capture and related defects and—more 
importantly—that they were in a position to do something about it.”). The extent to which these 
concerns justify more intrusive judicial oversight is beyond the scope of this essay. 
 121. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc., v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 122 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (“As with other reviews of administrative proceedings, we do not determine the convincing 
force of evidence, nor the conclusion it should support . . . .”). 
712 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:695 
The D.C. Circuit appears to have extended hard look analysis in 
Business Roundtable and its predecessor cases by adding a specific re-
quirement concerning cost-benefit analysis. In Business Roundtable, the 
court stated that the SEC is required to “apprise itself—and hence the 
public and the Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed 
regulation.”122 The source of this additional obligation is unclear.123 
The only authorities cited by the court for the requirement are the 
court’s prior decisions in Chamber of Commerce124 and Public Citizen.125 
Presumably, because Public Citizen dealt with rulemaking by the Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration and not the SEC, the applicability 
of that decision to the Business Roundtable context implies that the re-
quired cost-benefit analysis is a component of the APA and not an agen-
cy-specific statute.126 But, although Chamber of Commerce describes this 
obligation as “statutory,”127 neither of the prior decisions refers to any 
specific statute that requires an agency to determine the economic conse-
quences of a proposed rule.128 
One might, of course, argue that adopting a regulation without 
evaluating its costs and benefits is inherently irrational,129 but the au-
thority of a reviewing court to invalidate an agency rule on the basis of 
an inadequate cost-benefit analysis is not obvious. Indeed, a plausible 
argument can be made that the absence of such a requirement is the rea-
                                                 
 122. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 123. That cost-benefit analysis is not an inherent requirement for all agency rulemaking is 
highlighted by the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, in which 
the court specifically held that cost-benefit analysis was not required because it had nothing to do 
with the question before the EPA. 684 F.3d at 118; see also Schapiro, supra note 14 (“No statute 
expressly requires the Commission to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis as part of its rulemaking 
activities . . . .”). 
 124. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 125. Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 126. Notably, Public Citizen involved rulemaking pursuant to a specific statute in which Con-
gress directed the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) to consider specific factors 
that have no relevance outside the case-specific context. Id. The holding in that case was based on 
the FMCSA’s failure to consider one of those statutorily mandated factors; the subsequent discus-
sion of cost-benefit analysis to which the Chamber of Commerce court refers was dicta. See id. at 
1217 (“[W]e will not render final decision on petitioners’ other objections to the rule, as the failure 
of the agency to consider the statutorily mandated factor is dispositive . . . .”). 
 127. Chamber of Commerce, 412 F.3d at 143. 
 128. See id. (describing the SEC’s “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the econom-
ic implications of the rule it has proposed”). 
 129. Indeed, SEC chairmen have repeatedly stated that there is an expectation that the SEC 
would conduct cost-benefit analysis. See OIG REPORT I, supra note 91, at 4. On the other hand, one 
recent empirical study found that the quality of an agency’s cost-benefit analysis is not correlated 
with the net benefits of the rule. See generally Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of 
Regulatory Politics: Benefit-Cost Analysis and Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189 
(2012). 
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son that the President imposed such an obligation on executive branch 
(but not independent) agencies through Executive Orders 12866 and 
13563.130 Congress has also included an obligation to conduct cost-
benefit analysis in specific statutes, 131 but it has not incorporated a uni-
versal requirement of cost-benefit analysis into the APA.132 The Supreme 
Court has explicitly stated that, in the absence of specific statutory lan-
guage, an obligation to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis is not in-
ferred.133 
In addition, empirical analysis of proposed rulemaking has obvious 
limitations. It is difficult to predict the effect that a new rule will have, 
particularly with respect to financial-market regulation. Regulated enti-
ties may perceive the rule as changing existing norms and engage in sub-
stantial compliance or seek to avoid the rule through regulatory arbitrage. 
In addition, empirical analysis frequently requires regulators to extrapo-
late from transactions that are not comparable to those contemplated un-
der the proposal.134 Thus, the reliability of empirical evidence, even 
when carefully compiled, is questionable. 
B. Section 2(b) Review 
Congress has supplemented the rationality requirements of the APA 
with more particularized criteria to which SEC rulemaking must adhere. 
Although Congress originally authorized the SEC in the Securities and 
                                                 
 130. Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 
1993); Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 
(Jan. 21, 2011). 
 131. Congress has also, where appropriate, required agencies to follow specific rulemaking 
procedures in addition to those mandated by the APA, but when doing so, Congress generally uses 
precise language setting out its mandate. See, e.g., Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., 449 F.3d 
286, 300 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing, as an example, rulemaking procedures mandated for the EPA 
by the Clean Air Act). 
 132. The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress has the authority to forbid agencies 
from conducting cost-benefit analysis. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 217–18 
(2009). As Justice Breyer observed in his separate opinion, Congress might have legitimate reasons 
for seeking to reduce an agency’s reliance on cost-benefit analysis, including concerns that “[t]he 
preparation of formal cost-benefit analyses can take too much time, thereby delaying regulation . . . 
[and possibly causing the agency to] emphasize easily quantifiable factors over more qualitative 
factors.” Id. at 232 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 133. See, e.g., Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 238–39 (“Indeed, this Court has recognized that 
when Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated 
such intent on the face of the statute.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Am. Textile 
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (“When Congress has intended that an agency 
engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute.”). 
 134. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 38, at 25–27 (observing that empirical studies upon 
which the SEC and commentators relied involved proxy contests that were not directly comparable 
to those that would have occurred under Rule 14a-11). 
714 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:695 
Exchange Act of 1934 to promulgate rules “as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors,”135 in the National 
Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Congress added the re-
quirement that the SEC consider the degree to which its rules would 
promote “efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”136 Commenta-
tors have debated the extent to which this amendment was designed to 
sacrifice investor protection in favor of facilitating capital formation or 
increasing U.S. market competitiveness.137 Notwithstanding this debate, 
it is clear that the introduction of particularized statutory criteria author-
ized the courts to exercise increased judicial oversight.138 
The nature of this increased oversight is, however, unclear. In a 
careful and insightful new article, Jim Cox and Benjamin Baucom re-
view the legislative history of this provision and conclude that there is 
scant evidence Congress intended to change the standard for judicial re-
view significantly or to impose substantial new burdens on SEC rule-
making.139 In particular, section 2(b) does not direct the SEC to conduct a 
cost-benefit analysis.140 
It is further worth noting, as Cox and Baucom do, that the language 
in section 2(b) merely directs the SEC to consider specific factors; Con-
gress did not tell the SEC how to balance these factors against each oth-
er, specify a dominant factor, or mandate a net positive outcome.141 In-
                                                 
 135. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-404, ch. 401, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 
881, 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-pp). 
 136. Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106, 110 Stat. 3416, 3434 (1996) (adding section 2(b), which 
provides, “Whenever pursuant to this subchapter [15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa] the Commission is en-
gaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); see 15 
U.S.C. § 77b(b). 
 137. See, e.g., Duke K. Bristow et al., Venture Capital Formation and Access: Lingering Im-
pediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 77, 104 (2004) (ex-
pressing skepticism about the extent to which amendments to the National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act (NSMIA) are likely to facilitate capital formation); Kevin A. Jones, The National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53 
ARK. L. REV. 153, 155 (2000) (praising the NSMIA’s value for capital formation by preempting 
inconsistent state regulation). 
 138. See, e.g., David W. Schnare, Environmental Rationality and Judicial Review: When Bene-
fits Justify Costs Under the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 65, 98 (1998) (explaining how 1996 Amendments to the Clean Water Act, 
which mandate a specific process for the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis, establish a higher standard of 
review than the APA’s hard look). 
 139. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the 
DC Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811 (2012). 
 140. See, e.g., Schiller v. Tower Semiconductor, Ltd., 449 F.3d 286, 300 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 141. Cox & Baucom, supra note 139, at 1818–20. 
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deed, many financial regulations are likely to produce conflicting results 
when analyzed in accordance with these factors. For example, increasing 
investor protection frequently imposes costs on capital formation, as il-
lustrated most compellingly by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.142 Conversely, 
reducing the disclosure requirements for emerging growth companies 
sacrifices investor protection as illustrated by the JOBS Act.143 Thus, the 
SEC’s consideration of the four statutory factors is unlikely to be out-
come determinative. 
How, then, should a court assess the SEC’s analysis under section 
2(b)? The Supreme Court’s language in State Farm is instructive.144 Be-
cause section 2(b) identifies specific factors for the SEC’s consideration, 
the SEC’s rulemaking should describe the manner in which it has con-
sidered those factors—efficiency, competition, and capital formation.145 
Congress’s direction should be understood as a refinement of the SEC’s 
rulemaking process, not an invitation to the court to second-guess the 
SEC’s evaluation or prioritization of these factors. 
The above-described statutory constraints result in a distinct an-
tiregulatory bias. Specifically, as described in Part II.C of this Article, 
the SEC faces a very high hurdle in justifying new regulations.146 In con-
trast, the SEC’s failure to act is largely unreviewable. Although courts 
have occasionally upheld challenges to agency inaction in the face of a 
specific statutory rulemaking obligation, as a general rule, agencies have 
broad discretion to refrain from adopting regulations.147 Although the 
existing deregulatory bias may or may not be normatively desirable, its 
effect is significant in the context of congressionally directed rulemaking 
                                                 
 142. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (2002) (criticizing the costs imposed 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 143. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 144. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 145. See also Cox & Baucom, supra note 139, at 1831 (exploring the SEC’s analysis of the 
section 2(b) factors in promulgating Rule 151A). 
 146. See Doering, supra note 13. 
 147. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. FDA, No. 11 Civ. 3562 (THK), 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77384 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (finding that the FDA was arbitrary and capricious in failing 
to act on the findings of its own task force in 1972 and failing to act on two citizen petitions filed in 
1999 and 2005 on penicillin and other drugs that are added to animal feed in low-dose or 
“subtherapeutic” levels to prevent animal disease). See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing the scope of judicial review for an agency’s failure 
to adopt a proposed rule); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing 
and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1190 (2009) (discussing 
judicial review of an agency decision to withdraw proposed rulemaking). 
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initiatives such as those mandated by Dodd-Frank. This Article will re-
turn to that issue in Part V. 
IV. ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON SEC RULEMAKING 
In addition to the substantive constraints previously discussed, the 
SEC is subject to structural requirements concerning its rulemaking pro-
cedures. Two of these requirements are of particular importance in the 
context of Rule 14a-11: the notice-and-comment requirements of the 
APA and the open-meeting requirement of the Sunshine Act. This Part 
considers these additional constraints, which are often overlooked in the 
analysis of SEC rulemaking but which play a critical role in the effec-
tiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the rulemaking process. Notably, the con-
straints described in this Part are not unique to the SEC but apply to a 
variety of executive and independent agencies. This Part focuses specifi-
cally on their application to SEC rulemaking. 
A. The Notice-and-Comment Procedure 
The APA requires administrative agencies to follow specific proce-
dures when they engage in rulemaking.148 In particular, section 553 of 
the APA requires most agency rulemaking to comply with the notice-
and-comment procedure.149 Agencies using this procedure must publish a 
general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, including 
“(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making pro-
ceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is pro-
posed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a de-
scription of the subjects and issues involved.”150 The agency must then 
provide at least thirty days for interested parties to submit their data, 
views, or arguments for agency consideration.151 The agency then con-
siders the comments it receives and adopts a final rule, which must be 
published in the Federal Register before it is effective.152 
                                                 
 148. Technically, notice-and-comment rulemaking is informal agency rulemaking. Formal 
rulemaking requires a hearing and is akin to a trial. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557. 
 149. Id. § 553. Agencies can avoid the notice-and-comment requirements by issuing informal 
guidance or interpretive rules. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal 
Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2007) (explaining how agencies use these mecha-
nisms to bypass the notice-and-comment procedure). 
 150. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3). 
 151. See id. § 553(c)–(d). 
 152. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and 
the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1321 (1992) 
(describing requirements for the promulgation of legislative rules). 
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Courts have elaborated on these requirements. An agency must, for 
example, provide fair notice of both its originally intended rule and its 
final rule—substantial changes between the two may be held to have de-
prived the public of its opportunity to comment.153 Agencies must dis-
close the data upon which they have relied and justify their decision in 
terms of the administrative record.154 Finally, agencies must consider 
reasonable alternatives, including alternatives suggested by comment-
ers.155 
The SEC’s notice-and-comment procedures have evolved over 
time. Although written comments are open to the public, for many years 
these comments were only available at the SEC library or through a re-
quest for photocopies. Today, comments may be submitted electronically 
and are available on the SEC website.156 Importantly, however, the pro-
cess only provides the public with access to the substance of comments 
that are communicated in writing. 
The notice-and-comment process is not the exclusive mechanism 
interested parties use to communicate their views to SEC officials. A 
substantial number of these communications take place through private 
meetings between SEC officials and interested parties. Although the SEC 
discloses the existence of these meetings and the identities of the partici-
pants in the comment file, the meetings are not open to the public, and 
the substance of the discussions is not publicly available.157 
In an effort to provide the public with the opportunity to give input 
on regulatory proposals at an earlier stage—an effort motivated by the 
rulemaking directives in Dodd-Frank—the SEC created a new public-
comment page in 2010.158 The new page enables interested parties to 
                                                 
 153. See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103–05 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 154. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify 
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997). 
 155. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. FERC, 873 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[W]here a 
party raises facially reasonable alternatives . . . the agency must either consider those alternatives or 
give some reason . . . for declining to do so.”). 
 156. Comments may be submitted with an online form, by e-mail, through Regulations.gov, or 
in writing. The SEC posts all comments on its website—paper comments are scanned and posted in 
a PDF format. See How to Submit Comments on SEC Rulemaking, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/submitcomments.htm (last modified Jan. 1, 2009). 
157. See also Keith Paul Bishop, Ex Parte Communications and SEC Rulemaking, CAL. CORP. 
& SEC. LAW (June 19, 2012), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2012/06/ex-parte-communications-and-
sec-rulemaking/ (describing and criticizing the SEC’s use of private meetings and its failure to dis-
close more information about them). 
 158. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PUBLIC COMMENT PAGE FOR SEC INITIATIVES UNDER DODD-
FRANK ACT, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regreformcomments.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
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provide comments even prior to the SEC’s formal rulemaking pro-
posals.159 
At the same time, the SEC announced that it would follow “newly-
established best practices when holding meetings with interested parties 
in order to ensure full transparency to the public.”160 Despite these best 
practices, the memoranda of meetings included in the public-comment 
file continue to disclose only the identities of the parties involved and the 
general topic under discussion unless the participants voluntarily provide 
additional written information.161 The memoranda do not include a de-
scription of the position taken by the parties, arguments or other infor-
mation provided to the Commission and its staff, or any other substantive 
information. 
B. Government in the Sunshine Act 
Although commentators have examined and criticized the notice-
and-comment procedure in some detail, the other structural constraint—
the Government in the Sunshine Act162—has received less attention. The 
Sunshine Act was passed in 1976 as part of the open-records reforms 
adopted in response to the Watergate era.163 The Act requires that meet-
ings of multi-member government agencies be open to the public with at 
least seven days advance public notice.164 The Act defines a meeting as 
the “deliberation” of at least a quorum of individual agency members 
regarding agency business.165 As applied to the SEC, this definition 
                                                 
 159. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chairman Schapiro Announces Open 
Process for Regulatory Reform Rulemaking (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2010/2010-135.htm. 
 160. Id. 
 161. These meetings continue to occur frequently. For example, the SEC’s Dodd-Frank web-
site disclosed eighty-four meetings prior to June 15, 2012, concerning the topic of definitions includ-
ing swap and security-based swap under Title VII of Dodd-Frank. See Comments on Concept Re-
lease: Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-16-10/s71610.shtml#meetings 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2012). 
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 552b. 
 163. See Daniel P. Finney, Watergate Scandal Changed the Political Landscape Forever, USA 
TODAY (June 16, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-16/watergate-scandal-
changed-political-landscape/55639974/1. Other reforms adopted in response to Watergate were the 
Ethics in Government and Presidential Records Acts. 
 164. The Sunshine Act lists ten exemptions that largely parallel the exemptions under the Free-
dom of Information Act. Special Comm., Admin. Conference of the U.S., Report & Recommenda-
tion by the Special Committee to Review the Government in the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 
421, 421 (1997). Importantly, unlike the Freedom of Information Act, the Sunshine Act does not 
contain an exemption for predecisional meetings. Id. 
 165. 5 U.S.C. § 552b. The House Judiciary Committee noted, in hearings held the year after 
the adoption of the Sunshine Act, that the vague definition of “meeting” had the potential effect of 
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means that no more than two SEC commissioners can meet privately to 
discuss or deliberate agency business.166 
The purpose of the Act is to render agency policymaking transpar-
ent by subjecting it to public view.167 In effect, however, the Act pre-
cludes private policy deliberations among agency heads and undermines 
the collaborative and bipartisan structure of the SEC.168 By requiring that 
discussions take place in public, the Act subjects them to media scrutiny, 
interest-group attention, and political pressure.169 These pressures make it 
more difficult for commissioners to modify their positions and engage in 
compromise. They also have the counterintuitive effect of reducing the 
transparency of the agency’s true decisionmaking.170 As a result, public 
meetings have become, in effect, formal procedures in which commis-
sioners articulate their previously developed positions on the stated 
agenda items rather than engage in meaningful discussions.171 
                                                                                                             
undermining the ability of agencies to engage in their regular operations. See Government in the 
Sunshine Act Implementation: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Govern-
mental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 6–7 (1977) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of Richard Berg, Exec. Sec’y, Admin. Conference of the U.S.) (noting the difficulty of 
drawing a line identifying preliminary discussions that would not be subject to the Act). 
 166. During periods in which there are vacancies on the Commission, a quorum consists of two 
commissioners, and the Sunshine Act prohibits any private meetings or discussions between the 
commissioners. The SEC frequently operates with one or more vacant seats. See, e.g., Commissioner 
Paul Atkins Stepping Down From SEC, NAT’L J., May 5, 2008 (describing both Democratic seats on 
the Commission as vacant); Lynn Stevens Hume, Loss of Roberts May Put SEC in Legal Bind, Law-
yers Say, BOND BUYER, May 25, 1995 (reporting that a third commissioner’s departure would leave 
the SEC with just two sitting commissioners). 
 167. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delib-
erative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 190 (1997) (explaining the rationale for the 
Sunshine Act). The Act allows the public to attend and observe these meetings but does not provide 
the public with an affirmative power to participate. Id. 
 168. See id. at 210–17 (explaining tension between participation and deliberation). 
 169. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 165, at 10 (statement of Richard Berg, Exec. Sec’y, Admin. 
Conference of the U.S.) (noting that observers are likely to take advantage of comments made during 
public meetings to challenge or delay the rulemaking process because “[t]he temptation to the prac-
ticing bar of getting in last licks on the strength of what has occurred in the commission meeting is 
well-nigh irresistible”). 
 170. See also Rossi, supra note 167, at 228–29 (explaining how public observation impairs 
collegiality of agency decisionmaking). 
 171. See Randolph May, Reforming the Sunshine Act, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 415, 416 (1997) 
(“Rather than actual, collective deliberation in public, agency members often use the open meeting 
merely to announce and explain their positions.”); Marcia Coyle, Agencies Ask for Less Sunshine, 
NAT’L L.J., Sept. 25, 1995, at A12 (quoting SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman as stating that open 
meetings are “short, scripted and perfunctory events involving no deliberation among agency offi-
cials”). 
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How then, does the SEC engage in policymaking? The SEC re-
sponded to the adoption of the Sunshine Act in three ways.172 First, indi-
vidual commissioners delegated policy discussions to members of their 
staffs, who were not subject to the mandates of the Act. Although staff 
members could privately discuss agency policy, they lacked the authority 
to modify the substantive positions of the commissioners whose views 
they represented. This in turn reduced the prospect of compromise. Se-
cond, the SEC began to make more frequent use of notation voting, in 
which a matter was presented to commissioners for seriatim action with-
out face-to-face discussion.173 Third, and perhaps most problematically, 
the Act encouraged commissioners to air disagreements in the form of 
public criticism of, or dissent from, agency decisions.174 
The Sunshine Act had the effect of concentrating the Commission’s 
power in the chairman’s office.175 By shifting the decisionmaking mech-
anism from that of a collegial group process to an individual 
decisionmaker, the Act arguably undercut the rationale for the Commis-
sion’s structure. First, this shift dissipated the effect of having an agency 
headed by multiple members.176 A variety of studies have noted the dif-
ferences between individual and collective decisionmaking,177 and the 
absence of an opportunity for group deliberation creates a fundamental 
change in the character of SEC decisions. Second, by removing a vehicle 
                                                 
 172. See Kathy Bradley, Note, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its 
Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473 (1997) (explaining 
agency policymaking responses to the adoption of the Sunshine Act). 
 173. See Special Comm., supra note 164, at 424 (describing increased use of notation voting 
by agencies subject to the Sunshine Act); Hearing, supra note 165, at 78 (statement of Harvey Pitt, 
Gen. Counsel, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (describing notation voting). 
 174. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., A Commissioner’s Anger, in INSIGHTS 4, 4 (1991) (criticizing 
Commissioner Fleischman’s public statements about the Commission and observing that, because of 
the Sunshine Act, Commissioner Fleischman lacked an appropriate forum for airing those concerns 
privately). 
 175. See, e.g., RICHARD K. BERG ET AL., AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN 
THE SUNSHINE ACT 222 (2d ed. 2005) (“There is clear evidence to support the view that [the Sun-
shine Act has] . . . served to enhance the influence of agency chairmen and staff.”). 
 176. See Special Comm., supra note 164, at 424 (“[T]he principal reason that Congress has 
established multi-member agencies in the first place is because Congress has made the judgment 
that, for the matters subject to the agency’s jurisdiction, there is a benefit from a collegial 
decisionmaking process that brings to bear on the ultimate decisions the diverse viewpoints of agen-
cy members who have differing philosophies, experiences, and expertise.”). It is worth noting that 
state corporate law has expressed a similar judgment in providing that corporations are to be man-
aged under the direction of boards of directors that exercise collective rather than individual authori-
ty. See, e.g., Fogel v. U.S. Energy Sys., Inc., No. 3271-CC, 2007 WL 4438978 (Del. Ch. Dec. 13, 
2007) (determining that an action of individual directors outside the context of a formal board meet-
ing did not constitute an action on behalf of the corporation). 
 177. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Govern-
ance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–19 (2002) (summarizing empirical studies of group decisionmaking). 
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for collective deliberation, the Act reduced the value of the requirement 
of a bipartisan commission by limiting the ability of minority commis-
sioners to influence regulatory outcomes. 
The Act also changed the manner in which commissioners received 
information. In particular, because of its mandates, the Act prioritized the 
commissioners’ access to information from interest groups and other 
stakeholders at the expense of information exchanges among the com-
missioners themselves. Because commissioners bring a range of experi-
ences and expertise to the agency, this shift sacrificed the sharing of that 
collective knowledge among the group of commissioners. 
In 1995, the chair of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS) was asked to review the Sunshine Act in light of these 
concerns.178 The chair established a special committee, held a series of 
public meetings, and concluded that there was substantial credible evi-
dence that the Act was having a negative effect on collective 
decisionmaking by multi-member agencies.179 The committee concluded 
that Congress should establish a pilot program to enable agencies to en-
gage in preliminary policymaking and deliberations outside of the pub-
lic-meeting context.180 Shortly after the committee made its recommen-
dations, however, Congress terminated the funding of the ACUS,181 and 
the committee’s recommendations were abandoned.182 
C. The Effect of These Constraints 
Although both the notice-and-comment process and the Sunshine 
Act have been defended in terms of transparency and democratic values, 
they sacrifice consensus building as well as decisionmaking efficiency, 
and they allow for the increased influence of political forces and interest 
groups.183 These sacrifices are of particular concern in the context of 
SEC rulemaking. Financial regulation involves high stakes and repeat 
industry players who have extensive control over critical information and 
                                                 
 178. Special Comm., supra note 164, at 421. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id.; see also May, supra note 171 (defending the special committee’s recommendation for 
a pilot program). Mr. May served as the chairman of the special committee. Id. at 415 n.a.; see also 
William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as 
an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (2009) (advocating an exception for predecisional debate). 
 181. See May, supra note 171, at 415 n.1 (citing H.R. Res. 2099, 104th Cong. (1995) (enact-
ed)). 
 182. Alan B. Morrison, Farewell Fond ACUS, We Loved You Well, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 169, 169 
(1998). 
 183. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers 
and The Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 595 (1984) (noting that “candor and the flexibility 
necessary for collaboration or compromise are more likely to flourish in the shade”). 
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ample financial resources, which they can use to influence the rulemak-
ing process.184 The SEC’s rulemaking structure enables these interest 
groups to engage in a high level of participation. More importantly, it 
allows industry groups to control the administrative record by submitting 
extensive comments and studies to which the SEC is then obligated to 
respond. As one legal advisor put it, “the D.C. Circuit’s decision under-
scores the importance of including in one’s comments expert and empiri-
cal analyses to contradict (or at least challenge) any unfounded assump-
tions, dubious principles, or debatable academic research on which an 
agency’s own analysis might be based.”185 
Cost-benefit analysis exacerbates this problem. Because regulated 
entities generally bear the costs of new regulation, the rulemaking pro-
cess creates incentives for them to highlight and overestimate those 
costs. The SEC does not receive comparable assistance in evaluating the 
benefits of its new regulations, which typically inure to the benefit of 
dispersed and less politically effective investors, consumers, or capital 
markets. Accordingly, industry groups dominate both the public and pri-
vate mechanisms for provision of information and influence.186 They are 
represented disproportionately in the comment letters and private meet-
ings, and they provide the overwhelming majority of comments that in-
clude data, statistics, or alternatives to the proposed rulemakings.187 
Several studies have documented the dominance of industry groups 
in financial rulemaking. Kim Krawiec, for example, found that banks and 
bank representatives have dominated Dodd-Frank rulemaking.188 In addi-
tion to filing lengthy submissions with supporting data and specially 
commissioned studies, banks accounted for ninety-three percent of the 
                                                 
 184. See Recent Case: Administrative Law—Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking—District 
of Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and Exchange Commission’s “Hedge Fund Rule”—
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1397 (2007) (observing 
that this rulemaking context may be “unique to the financial sector, in which systemic risk is high 
and regulated parties face strong incentives—and have substantial power—to avoid regulation”). 
 185. Heath P. Tarbert, Challenging Federal Agency Rulemakings, METROPOLITAN CORP. 
COUNS. (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/17129/challenging-federal-
agency-rulemakings. 
 186. See generally Matt Grossman, Interest Group Influence on US Policy Change: An As-
sessment Based on Policy History, 1 INTEREST GROUPS & ADVOC. 171 (2012), http://www.palgrave-
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private meetings with agency officials—meetings that are not open to the 
public and are only summarily reported in the public-comment file with-
out disclosure of the meeting content.189 
In another recent study, Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Li-
sa Peters find similar domination by regulated firms in the context of 
EPA rulemaking.190 Their study documents the fact that “[r]egulated 
firms submitted the vast majority of the detailed comments that had the 
potential to influence agency decision makers and to which agencies had 
to respond in order to satisfy reviewing courts.”191 Wagner and her col-
leagues also show that industry comments are more influential in affect-
ing the final version of adopted rules.192 
In addition to the loss of consensus-building and decisionmaking 
efficiency, the Sunshine Act also increases the impact of political forces 
by requiring a public meeting forum. Through this public forum, industry 
groups and the media can draw attention to any political (rather than just 
legal) vulnerabilities in the commissioners’ positions. Political forces are 
of concern in SEC rulemaking because of the substantial political influ-
ence of the financial sector—an influence no doubt assisted by the sub-
stantial political contributions made by financial firms.193 One recent 
empirical study found that political influence is likely to have a negative 
effect on the quality of rulemaking.194 Stuart Shapiro and John Morrall 
compare politically controversial rules to less salient ones and find that 
less politically controversial rules have higher net benefits.195 In the case 
of the SEC, it appears that political pressure has led the SEC to postpone 
or scale back a number of controversial rule proposals.196 
One can see the effect of these constraints on the emergence of 
Rule 14a-11. The proxy access rule was stalled for years in response to 
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forceful business group opposition.197 The SEC repeatedly revised its 
proposed rule, which, in every version, included complex qualification 
requirements or triggering conditions developed in response to concerns 
articulated by industry groups about excessive costs or the potential for 
abuse.198 In response to interest-group lobbying and political pressure,199 
the SEC structured its rule to exclude precisely the types of shareholders 
most likely to use it—public pension funds and hedge funds.200 I have 
written elsewhere on the deficiencies of the final rule, but throughout the 
rulemaking process, the SEC did not propose or adopt a rule designed to 
provide a meaningful level of proxy access, despite its claim that the rule 
was designed to simulate personal attendance at a shareholder meeting.201 
Most problematically, the SEC releases failed to make an affirma-
tive case justifying either proxy access as a general matter or its specific 
choices in promulgating the rule. In terms of the policy choice, nowhere 
in its releases did the SEC make the affirmative claim that shareholder 
nominations will improve corporate performance, corporate compliance, 
or board functioning. The SEC offered no theory as to what types of 
shareholders would seek to nominate directors or the purposes of these 
nominations. Nowhere did the SEC discuss the effect that shareholder-
nominated directors were likely to have on board functioning.202 
With respect to implementation, the rule was similarly deficient. 
The SEC did not set out the basis for adopting the three-year and three-
percent holding requirements. Although the SEC recognized that less 
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than a third of publicly traded companies have even a single shareholder 
who meets these requirements, the SEC releases did not defend its line 
drawing.203 Nor did it explain how, in light of these statistics, the rule 
was likely to have an impact. As Commissioner Casey observed in her 
dissent from the SEC’s decision to adopt the rule, the result was simply 
not a “meaningful” threshold.204 
Finally, as with other recent rulemakings, in the SEC’s adoption of 
Rule 14a-11, the SEC neither identified a problem that required redress 
nor explained how Rule 14a-11 was designed to resolve a problem. Alt-
hough the D.C. Circuit’s insistence on formal cost-benefit analysis was 
incorrect, the SEC did not articulate a policy rationale for adopting a fed-
eral rule mandating proxy access and dictating a single set of circum-
stances under which that proxy access could occur. In short, under the 
APA standard, the SEC’s actions appeared completely arbitrary, though 
not for any of the reasons articulated by the D.C. Circuit. 
The final version of Rule 14a-11 suffered greatly from the absence 
of meaningful deliberation among the commissioners. Although Chair-
man Schapiro initially championed the rule, her support for proxy access 
appeared to have decreased substantially by the time it was adopted.205 
Commissioner Paredes raised a number of concerns in his dissent from 
the Commission’s decision—most importantly the value of enabling 
companies to adopt individually tailored proxy access provisions through 
private ordering.206 Despite the potential for private ordering to address 
the qualification requirements and line drawing with which the SEC 
clearly struggled, the commissioners were unable to engage in the type of 
meaningful discussion that could have produced a private-ordering back-
stop or alternative that might have won Commissioner Paredes’s support. 
Similarly, as noted above, Commissioner Casey criticized the arbitrari-
ness of the rule’s line drawing.207 Frank deliberations might have enabled 
the Commission to produce numbers that both generated consensus and 
had some rational basis. Perhaps most troubling was the fact that, as with 
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a number of prior rulemakings, the commissioners’ disagreements were 
aired in the form of public dissents rather than ironed out through private 
deliberation and compromise. 
V. RETHINKING JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT 
The preceding Part explains how the procedural requirements for 
rulemaking, to which the SEC is subject, have the potential to disrupt the 
quality of the resulting rules. More problematically, the negative effects 
of transparency appear to have a chilling effect on the SEC’s ability to 
make collective policy choices, its willingness to identify its policy 
choices clearly, and its ability to defend the rationale for those choices. 
Potential solutions to these problems, as noted earlier, include revising 
the notice-and-comment procedures, limiting the application of the Sun-
shine Act to preliminary deliberations by SEC commissioners, or both. 
Another option is to shift the locus of the policy determination 
away from the SEC. If the D.C. Circuit’s concerns, for example, are 
rooted in a distrust of the agency’s capacity for sound policy choices, or 
if political or interest-group influence is compromising the agency’s in-
dependence, an alternative would be for Congress to reclaim a greater 
role in designating regulatory policy. 
Whether the SEC or Congress is better suited to formulate financial 
regulatory policy raises a variety of questions about comparative institu-
tional competence.208 These questions are properly the subject of another 
article. It is unnecessary here, however, to address the normative ques-
tion of whether Congress should exercise greater control over SEC rule-
making because Congress has done so, both in Dodd-Frank and the 
JOBS Act. This Part then considers how explicit congressional rulemak-
ing directives should affect the judicial oversight of the resulting SEC 
rules. 
What is perhaps most troubling about the Business Roundtable de-
cision is the court’s failure even to acknowledge that Congress explicitly 
authorized the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule as part of Dodd-Frank. 
Notably, departing from Congress’s traditional approach to SEC rule-
making, in which Congress simply delegates general rulemaking authori-
ty “as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors,”209 Dodd-Frank includes several alternative statutory approaches. 
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The first approach is congressionally mandated rulemaking. In sev-
eral provisions in Dodd-Frank, and many more in the JOBS Act, Con-
gress determined for itself the nature of its desired regulatory changes 
and directed the agency to adopt certain rules, specifying in some cases a 
fair amount of detail over the manner in which the rules should operate. 
An example of congressionally mandated rulemaking is “say on pay,” in 
which Congress not merely authorized but in fact compelled the SEC to 
adopt rules mandating advisory shareholder votes on executive compen-
sation.210 Congressional rulemaking directives should shift the nature of 
judicial oversight because Congress has resolved for itself the question of 
whether say on pay is good policy rather than leaving it to the SEC's 
judgment. 
What role, then, should judicial review play? Suppose, for example, 
that after conducting its notice-and-comment review, the SEC had de-
termined that the costs of say on pay outweighed the benefits.211 Presum-
ably, the SEC would nonetheless have been obligated, under the statute, 
to adopt the rule. Accordingly, it seems that the court could not reject the 
policy judgment upon which that rule was based. The case can be made 
that specific statutory directives trump the general limitations on agency 
lawmaking imposed by the APA. An alternative and perhaps better read-
ing is that agency rulemaking in response to a statutory directive is, by 
definition, not arbitrary. 
Could a court nonetheless determine that the agency’s implementa-
tion of congressional policy was flawed? Presumably, a rule that utterly 
failed to implement the mandated policy or that directly contradicted the 
statutory requirements would be invalid. But implementation decisions 
inherently involve line-drawing choices that lend a certain degree of arbi-
trariness to agency decisionmaking, as evidenced by Rule 14a-11. Line 
drawing that is inconsistent with the statutory goals or utterly lacks a ra-
tionale may render a rule invalid. If, however, a court requires an agency 
to defend its line-drawing choices with empirical data, it risks undermin-
ing Congress’s regulatory objectives or, worse, placing responsibility for 
the structure of the regulation in the hands of industry players who con-
trol the data and can commission studies designed to support their policy 
preferences. 
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Does the same analysis apply to proxy access? Not necessarily. In 
the case of proxy access, Congress took a different approach—
authorizing but not mandating SEC rulemaking.212 Should the specific 
rulemaking authorization lead a court to determine that Congress has 
resolved the policy issue for itself, or does the agency, in regulating pur-
suant to the directive, need to justify its policy choice? 
The question in the specific context of the proxy access rule is more 
complicated. In adopting Dodd-Frank, Congress explicitly considered 
statutorily mandating proxy access but ultimately decided against it.213 
The implications of this legislative history are unclear. Does it mean that 
Congress supported some type of proxy access but chose to leave the 
details to the SEC’s discretion? Or does the history suggest that Congress 
was unsure about the policy question of whether proxy access was desir-
able? 
Either way, this history warrants consideration in determining 
whether Congress had already resolved these policy questions and, if it 
had, identifying the role that this resolution should have on the extent 
and significance of the agency’s subsequent cost-benefit analysis. The 
Business Roundtable case highlights the importance of considering con-
gressional policy choices in determining the appropriate scope of judicial 
oversight of agency rulemaking, and the Business Roundtable court utter-
ly failed in that obligation. At a minimum, the court should have deter-
mined whether Congress had already made the decision that a proxy ac-
cess rule was good policy. If it had, requiring the SEC to justify the 
rulemaking usurps the role, not of the SEC, but of Congress. 
Why then, one might ask, did the SEC fail to appeal the case to the 
U.S. Supreme Court?214 One additional factor must be considered. If 
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Dodd-Frank reflects a congressional determination on the desirability of 
proxy access, it should be understood as changing the nature of the 
SEC’s discretionary authority. 
In the case of general delegations of rulemaking authority to an 
agency, the agency has virtually no affirmative obligation to regulate.215 
In the case of congressional mandates, however, Congress has presuma-
bly reduced the agency’s discretion, rendering a failure to act, or at least 
a failure to act in accordance with the mandate, subject to challenge. If 
Congress tells the agency to regulate, it is required to do so, and arguably 
the APA then authorizes the court to determine whether the agency 
rulemaking is faithful to the policy choices reflected in the statutory 
mandate. At a minimum, the court should have the power to invalidate 
rulemakings on the basis that they are ineffective in meeting the congres-
sionally identified objectives. Even where Congress merely authorizes 
but does not require rulemaking, a rule that fails to meet the implicit pol-
icy objective behind the authorization is arguably irrational. 
This presents the most difficult challenge for the SEC with respect 
to Rule 14a-11. As I have noted above and argued in more detail else-
where, Rule 14a-11 offered little in terms of meaningful proxy access.216 
To the extent that Congress’s authorization of a proxy access rule in 
Dodd-Frank reflected the decision that a federal proxy access rule was 
good regulatory policy, a rule that failed to provide effective access was 
inconsistent with that congressional judgment. To the extent that the SEC 
purported to articulate its own independent justification for the rule, or 
for the line drawing it contained, the rule fell short on the very grounds 
that the SEC offered in its defense—enhancing shareholders’ preexisting 
state-law election rights by replicating their presence at a shareholders 
meeting. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Increasingly, intensive judicial scrutiny of agency rulemaking, and 
the economic analysis in support of that rulemaking in particular, create 
substantial challenges for the SEC. The SEC’s task is complicated by a 
variety of statutory and structural constraints that frustrate the Commis-
sion’s ability to engage in collective decisionmaking. Although the D.C. 
Circuit has framed its criticisms of SEC rulemaking in terms of flawed 
economic analysis, the problem is more fundamental. A combination of 
structural factors limits the ability of SEC commissioners to make regu-
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latory choices through collective deliberation and political compromise. 
These limitations resulted in a proxy access rule that lacked both a mean-
ingful justification for its adoption and, seemingly, the support of the 
Commission itself, rendering the rule highly vulnerable. More problem-
atically, Rule 14a-11 is not unique, and judicial invalidation of SEC 
rulemaking has become commonplace. 
The promulgation of poorly reasoned rules in which adopting agen-
cies lack confidence is not easily corrected through the adoption of more 
elaborate procedures for economic analysis. A stronger response to these 
concerns would be to reconsider the dominance of transparency over 
other values in the regulatory process. The proposals to amend the Sun-
shine Act and provide greater space for private agency deliberations 
would be a valuable first step. A perhaps more politically feasible ap-
proach is for Congress to exert greater control over regulatory policy 
choices. Although this approach would subject regulatory policymaking 
to increased political pressure, reducing agency discretion over financial-
market regulation may be desirable and could potentially increase con-
gressional accountability for capital-market regulation. This choice 
would effect a significant change from the modern administrative state. 
If courts cannot and do not trust agencies to make regulatory policy, 
however, they should defer to Congress’s decision to make those policy 
choices for itself. 
 
